DEVEIvOPMBNTAL ETHICS''
BY ANTONIO LLANO.
[Concluded.]

IF,

passing from the general principles of the doctrine to

we endeavor

its

prac-

harmonise our ordinary moral
judgments (whose validity is accepted by Dr. Carus, as by every
one else) with that law of evolution (whether of "soul" or other)
from which alone all ethical conceptions can derive their authority
and legitimacy, we again find ourselves in a labyrinth of perplexities, escape from which can only be secured by surrendering all
tical applications,

morality.

The

evolution of

man

to

is

not a simple process, a simple

motion governed by one single force it is a very complex process,
a motion whose propelling force is the resultant of many different,
although concurrent, forces, some acting in one direction, some in
another, and many of them opposed to one another.
From such
combination human development in general, and "soul development" in particular, arise; nor could mankind move as it does if
the combination were not what it is, or if any of the constituent
components of the resultant force were lacking. Of these components some present themselves in the form of human actions accompanied by consciousness and, since they all have their share
in the general movement, they must all be regarded as necessary
factors of development; i. e., all human actions must, whatever
their nature, be considered, according to the developmental standard of goodness, morally good. And to this it will be no scientific
or logical answer to say, that development would take place faster
and follow a better path (whatever may be meant by "better"), if
some modes of conduct were omitted, and replaced by opposite
modes of conduct for this is to abandon the position that evolu:

;

;

IFor the

first

part of Mr. Llano's article see The Open Court for

March

1897.
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every moment, can take place only in one direction and at

and that

one rate of speed,

it

must so take place

and

;

to

frame an

imaginary, subjective standard of what ought to be, instead of preserving the scientific and objective standard of what

is

and must

We

cannot escape from the logical consequences of universal
determinism in whatever direction we turn, the austere and implacable monster of Necessity rises before us, proclaiming, with
be.

:

he

his very silence, that
able.

and

if

we

is

the eternal and, therefore, the irrevoc-

cannot be moved, for he has no heart

;

nor convinced,

an automaton made of inflexible material
recognise him as our master, we must be satisfied to watch

he has no brain; he

for

in

He

is

submissive resignation the everlasting motions of the wonderful

and awful mechanism.

The process

presupposes the conflict between antagonistic forces and tendencies. In the moral world, as
of evolution

itself

in the physical world, there is a struggle for existence,

individuals, at least

The higher

if

not

among what have been termed moral

among
ideals.

have not been realised except through, and by
the lower ideals are, therefore, inBut by this
dispensable, if there is to be any development at all.
I do not mean to repeat the truism that what was morally good
yesterday is to-day morally bad the idea I intend to convey is,
that, at any given period, the morally good (I now use the word in
its ordinary sense) cannot usually become better, that is, progress
(either by gaining in intensity, or by being propagated), unless
helped in its course by the morally bad the consequence being
that the morally bad, viewed now as a necessary factor of the morally good, ceases to be really bad
our judgment must be reversed,
and we must say that in such cases every action is morally good.
the agency

ideals

of,

the lower ideals

;

:

;

:

I hope, make my position perfectly clear.
The teachings of Jesus of Nazareth are by many, Dr. Carus
among them, considered as the starting point and the root of all

An

illustration will,

modern morality.
in the

capacious

After the legendary element has been strained
filter of

"Christian scholarship," and the moral

residue treated with the powerful chemicals of "interpretation,"
the New Testament is found to contain the highest truths and prin-

and thus the revolution worked by Jesus in the
is likened, both for its legitimacy and its imBut it is,.
portance, to the astronomical revolution of Copernicus.
I believe, allowed by all students of Christian morals that the bare
precepts of Jesus would have made little impression upon the old
Romans and their barbarian conquerors, had they not been accomciples of ethics

whole

life of

;

mankind
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panied by those narratives appealing to the imaginational and emothe stories of his struggling life and his
tional parts of our nature,
patiently borne passion, crowned by his awful death. The best credential of his moral code was the seal of martyrdom stamped upon

—

by the heroic sacrifice of Calvary; and had this tragedy never
been related to the Western World, the precepts of Jesus might
to-day be slumbering among the utopic vagaries of what the great-

it

est of

Roman

historians described as a superstitious people,

who

distinguished themselves by the odious characteristic of being the
of human kind.
What judgment, then,

enemies

are

we

to pass

betrayers, and the executioners of Jesus?

upon the persecutors, the
He was not an independ-

ent, self-existing, extra-cosmical personality:

but for his surround-

ings and the state of the world at the time of his advent, his

work
would have been impossible. His work was not a simple nor an isolated event it was, scientifically considered, a complex phenomenon, of which his moral teachings were only a factor, some of the
olher factors being the actions of his enemies, his denunciators, and
:

his crucifiers.

From

a naturalistic point of view, Pontius Pilate,

and Judas Iscariot himself, were component elements of the great
compound whole, which, operating upon the minds of men, was to
revolutionise the moral world their actions were really not theirs:
they were, so to speak, the instruments of nature, even as Jesus
himself was the instrument of nature and in those actions we must
see, not the acts of free and independent wills, but the necessary
operations of the eternal laws of the cosmos, which, for the carrying on of the evolutionary process, must make use of the martyr
and the assassin alike, each being as indispensable as the other;
they both conform to the laws of the cosmos,
they are the laws of
the cosmos themselves they both further the evolution of the race,
they are but terms of the sum total of progress; given the actual
constitution of the universe, progress would be as impossible without the one or the other, as the existence of a whole without its
parts. Judged, then, by the standard of development, are they not
both equally moral, both equally good? It will, perhaps, be argued
that Jesus himself had reached a higher stage of development,
while his enemies were yet in a state of relative undevelopment.
But in this case the question is only one of degree; Jesus, we may
grant, was better, but they also were good.
By what criterion can
we trace the line of demarcation between the good and the bad?
Nor can the question be evaded by taking into consideration the
;

;

—

;

—

feelings, the inte?itions of the actors that took part in the

momentous
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tragedy for, apart from the fact that the persecutors of Jesus were
probably acting in good faith and in obedience to the dictates of
their "categoric imperative," it must be remembered that our crite;

rion

entirely objective; or,

is

if

we take account

of the subjective

must be from an objective point of view; from the point
of view, namely, of what the consequences of that subjective element must be upon the development of the race. Nor, again, can
element,

it

it be said that the objectiveness of our criterion consists, not in
judging actions by their consequences, but in taking in the objective world the necessary data for the direction of otir conduct ; for

would be an ethics of egoism, not of development the ethics
development is an "ethics of eternity," embracing the past, the
present, and the future of the race.^ The immediate causes of voluntary human actions are human feelings; and feelings from which
this

:

of

the evolution of the race results cannot, according to the "ethics

be declared bad or immoral. The feelings of Judas
from which resulted the sacrifice of Calvary, from which
resulted the adoption of Christianity, from which resulted the elevation of mankind, have to be accepted as necessary antecedents
of the alleged redemption, i. e., as necessary factors of moral evoor, to place the subject on its true bearings, as necessary
lution
of eternity,"
Iscariot,

;

factors of cosmical evolution in general; and, as such, those feel-

must be declared good.
may, perhaps, be thought that the foregoing remarks are
too far-fetched, and that they come from a misapprehension, or

ings

It

even a perversion, of the theory I am criticising; for it is repeatedly
stated by Dr. Carus that the elevation of the soul is the test of
progress, and he says very distinctly that the "nature of moral
goodness" "must be sought in the quality of our ideas and motives."^ I shall, therefore, endeavor to present with all candor the
reply that can be made, from his point of view, to the objections
I have just adduced.
Human conduct, it will be said, consists in voluntary movements made in response to impressions received, directly or indirectly, from the outer world, and aiming at an adaptation of the organism to his environment, especially the social environment. The
interpretation of those impressions and of the necessary conditions
of adaptation are forms of consciousness we term judgments. Judgments, then, are the subjective regulators of conduct and it is therefore obvious that our actions will be better adapted to their ends
in proportion as our judgments are more correct, or, as Dr. Carus
;

"i^

Ethical Problevt,

p. 42.

2

The Monist, L,

4,

p. 564.
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says, in proportion as

we approach nearer

to truth.

the first -condition, for a scientific direction of

edge

of the objective

laws of nature

;

and the

It

follows that

conduct
first

is

knowl-

thing to be in-

quired into, when a line of conduct is proposed, is, how it will tally
with those laws, or what its consequences will be, according to
those laws, as they have been revealed to us by the attentive exam-

phenomena. In this sense, then, it may be said
must be objective it must be, and canfound in the immutable order of the outer world. The

ination of natural

that the standard of ethics

not but be,

:

fact, we may take it as an
conduct which is moulded so as to conform to
and of the man whose motives
that law, we may say that it is moral
correspond with that law, we may say that he is good. By doing
this we have not exchanged our objective criterion for a subjective
for, although we judge a man by his motives, those mocriterion
tives themselves are judged by the higher standard
the law of
evolution, which, when applied to man, and viewed on its "spiritual " side, may with propriety be called the moral law.
The consideration of motives is an indispensable element of moral judgments, for the simple reason that morality is only predicable of
thinking beings, the causes of whose actions are motives were we
to judge merely by consequences, we should have to speak of
brutes, trees, and stones, as of moral creatures. Nor is it sufficient
that a man's motive should be what is ordinarily called a ''good
intention "
for herein comes our objective criterion to inquire
whether that intention, when carried out, will further the evolution

law

of evolution

ethical guide

:

being a well ascertained

of

;

;

—

:

;

of the race
it

;

and, unless his intention comply with this condition,

cannot be called good.

Such examples,

then, as that of Jesus's

although these men may have
acted in good faith, they were ignorant of the true course of human development; they were immoral through their ignorance, or
at least they were not good men
they may be excusable, but this
does not make them moral. Furthermore, it has to be admitted
that we ourselves are liable to form erroneous judgments as to the
laws of nature, and that some of our actions may be viewed by our
descendants as we now view the proceedings of the Inquisitors
but this is a necessary, although unfortunate, consequence of the
limitations of human knowledge
all we can say is that, for us,
those actions are morally good to which we are prompted by motives that, according to the facts known to us, and to the interpretation we can give them, we believe to be faithful responses to
the requirements of the law of human progress.
persecutors, cannot be justified

;

for,

;

;

:
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the

is

same general ob-

conceive to be applicable to the whole system

I

— inconsist-

Development is here presented as the end, the ideal, of
ethics; as an object whose realisation must be the purpose of moral
It must, then, be accepted as the most desirable condiconduct.
If
tion, or, in the language of other moralists, the sjimmum l?onu?n.
we ask why this is a desirable good, we are answered that "we
have to be pleased with the development of our race according to
the laws of nature," and that "those who are displeased might
just as well commit suicide at once, for they will go to the wall,
they will disappear from the stage of life. Those alone will survive
who are pleased with what the laws of nature demand." Ethics, it
ency.

is added, formulates general rules, based on
doing what we shall after all have to do."^

facts, to

"assist us in

Leaving aside the hedonistic spirit of these statements, we
to explain what they are intended to explain
for, while it is true that, science teaches us what we ''have to'' do
under certain circumstances, this "have to" refers to an end determined in advance; it is what we '' have to'' do in order to atfind

them inadequate

an

iai?i

the if

object in view.

The

ethical ought

is

a conditional must;

the sine qua non of ethics, and for this reason

is

an

if.

in

the

all

ethical

some kind

structures have to be erected on an assumption of

— on

The foregoing propositions, therefore, are to be understood
sense that we must adapt our means to human develop-

ment, considered beforehand as a desirable end
beforehand, for
experience teaches us that we can follow a different line, whether
:

we "go

to the

wall" or not; and, consequently, we have

to

follow

the line of development z/we have accepted the idea of development
as our guide.

modes

of

As the choice between the two apparently possible

conduct

is

a subjective operation

—a

matter of desire

have said above, in the
hypothesis that we have already chosen one form of conduct or the
ether.
This criterion, then, does not tell us why one conduct is
more desirable than the other; for, although it assures us that by
following the wrong line we shall "go to the wall," this is simply
the statement of a possible fact, which leaves us in absolute ignorance as to what is meant by "going to the wall," seeing that in
many cases the immoral man attains his end. As to the highly
praised and so oft repeated criterion of facts and laws of nature
and the development of the soul in the direction of truth, it may
be said that it amounts to but a useful and necessary tool, as useour objective criterion only applies, as

1

The Monist, L,

4,

pp. 553, 554, and

VL,

4,

p. 589.

I
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malefactor as to the saint

ful to the

— indeed,

more

useful to the

malefactor.

be accepted as an end in and by
own sake, and for its sake alone.
Its desirability cannot be established (even if this were logical) by
an absolute must, for experience shows that we can, and often do,

Development, then,

itself, to

is

be striven after for

move counter

to

its

development; nor

by reference to any
would be the
Such efforts at justification as that immoral conduct
standard.
"will lead to certain ruin,"^ and the like, are either a begging of
We arrive thus at an
the question or a surrender of the criterion.
ultimate postulate, which must be assumed as a fact not susceptible
the postulate, namely, that development is the
of demonstration
most desirable object, and, as such, the sjimmmn boninn. And here
we are confronted by a notorious contradiction for, while Dr. Carus
declares that "ethics should not start from any assumptions,"- his
system cannot be built except on the assumption (assumption, as
being a matter of subjectivity) that development is desirable in and
by itself. To say that development consists in agreement with
facts, or in an approximation to truth, may be a definition of what
development is, but its desirability remains an ultimate postulate
to

other end or standard,

justified

for, in this case,

that other end

;

;

an ultimate assumption. Even the reduction of progress to "soul" is an implicit substitution of subjectivism for objectivism, an unconscious return to the judging of nature by the stand-

development

ard of our feelings.

Admitting, then, that development

and

besides being desirable,

that,

it

is
is

desirable in and by
actually desired,

I

itself,

shall

leave other difficulties aside, and pass to the immediate conse-

quences

of the

developmental theory, as thus understood

said ?«/i--understood).

shall endeavor' to

I

(I

almost

show how the objective

sub-standard and the ideal standard can be combined, and what the
results of the

The

combination must be.
condition of our ideal of development

is that it should
be conceived as something possible or capable, of being realised by
a due application of the laws of nature with which we are acquainted and when, on the application of these laws, we find that
our end is not attained, we must at once recognise that our ideal was
such only in the popular sense of the word that it was a dream
or, scientifically expressed, that we were in error, and that the object of our pursuit was only a logical possibility, conceived by us

first

;

—

\

Funda»iental Problems,

2

The Monist.

I., 4,

p. 555.

p. igS

;

Ethical Problem, pp. 31-32.

;
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such through ignorance of some unexpected circumstances
which make the realisation of the desired end an actual impossiin other words, we have to remodel our ideal so as to make
bility
as

;

it

conform

to the actual facts of reality, thus constantly

modifying

our subjective standard by our objective sub-standard, the former

A consequence of
being mostly formal, the latter experimental.
judge
actions
or
individuals
that
we
cannot
by their motives
this is
at least, that

we

disapprobation.

judgment

are not justified in passing any

of

moral

For, motives being themselves a part of our ideal,

we may conceive and

desire a special form of development

certain motives exist

;

but

if,

where
by actual observation, we discover

that those motives do not exist, or that the contrary motives exist,

and

that, furthermore, these are not

means

at our disposal,

capable of being changed by any

we must conclude

without the host; that development does

that

we were reckoning
matter of actual

not, as a

we ^^ have to be
pleased" with what really exists, we cannot disapprove of any existing motives, whatever they may be.
The only feeling we can consistently experience is one of disappointment at the erroneousfact,

take account of our supposed motives; and, as

ness of our judgments and the frustration of our expectations; but
all verdict of immorality is out of the question, as the form of development with which we finally ^' have to be pleased " is that form
which actually takes place, not the form we have in our minds.
We may, no doubt, cling to our definition, and say that a moral
man is one whose motives correspond to our ideal of development

but this definition

is

nothing but the statement of a logically possi-

ble fact, and, being stripped of

all

entirely loses its ethical importance.

feeling of praise

And

it is

with regard to the realisation of our ideal, although
the ideal can (that
the event

is,

fnay^

and blame,

further evident

we

that,^

think that

be realised in a certain manner, yet

— the actual fact — prove that the ideal

is

if

realised in a dif-

manner, we must again confess that our conception of the
means was inadequate, that the means that nature has employed
are the ofily possible means, and that, unless we give up the realisation of the ideal, those means must be regarded with approba-

ferent

IThe words of Antoninus the Philosopher (quoted by Dr. Carus himself) are a very clear statement of the monistic and deterniinist views (although the Stoics were not determinists in the
modern sense of the term) "All is suitable to me, O Cosmos, that is suitable to thee
Nothing
" There is hardly anythat for thee is in due time is for me too early or too late." And again
thing foreign to any other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form
one and the same cosmos." Remember also the words of Epictetus " If any one go to the bath
too early, say not that he does wrong, but that he bathes before time. If any one drinks too much
wine, say not that he does wrong to drink, but that he drinks too much. For, before thou knowest what moves him to act, how knowest thou whether he do wrong ? "
!

:

:

:
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tion, or, at least, not
I

have been

Thus

with disapprobation.

illogical in

my

I

do not believe

application of the developmental prin-

ciples (even in the above distorted form) to the actions

connected with the

life

and death

further or retard the progress of
sions,^ and,

if

literally taken,

To

of Jesus.

mankind

and men
we can

say that

are metaphorical expres-

they betray an absolute ignorance of

the difference between the logically possible, based on assmnpiions,

and the actually possible, based on reality. There is only one process of evolution, only one direction and one speed of progress, all
predetermined from eternity, i. e., contained in the universe as potentialities that are actualised at definite times and in definite places.
This is scientific and philosophical fatalism, but not practical fatalism for we are never absolutely certain of what will take place,
and, in that uncertainty, we act as if to accomplish what we believe
may happen but, should the event disappoint our expectation,
all we can say is that the event could not be what we believed it
;

;

would

be.

Before closing this part of my discussion, I would call attention to some features of the law of development, which, I think,
will farther strengthen my position.

The

universe, mechanically considered,

is

bly infinite) system, the fundamental law of

an immense (probawhose operations is

Whatever our ideas of force may
phenomenon can be described as a reaction, in the sense
that it is the response of a mode of existence to the action of another mode of existence. This law, also known as the law of causation, operates with equal rigidity (at least we believe so) in the
the law of action and reaction.
be, every

region of the intellect and of the emotions,

—

in the world of knowledge and in the world of morality; and, just as in the physical
world it would be unreasonable, nay irrational, to expect an effect
where the cause was wanting, it would be in the same degree unreasonable and irrational to expect, in the moral world, the rise of
higher conditions, which can only originate as reactions on lower
conditions, without the existence of those lower conditions. The
features of our civilisation of which we so often boast as our glorious achievements have originated in the antagonism between opposite social forces, opposite tendencies and ideals
liberty has
been born in oppression, toleration in political and religious despotism and, while we may deplore that such should be the law of
:

;

1

Thus

nature,

Dr. Carus says that, although the soul-development of the race "

man

can, to a great extent,

make

or

mar

his

own

fate

is of a spontaneous
and that of his race." {Ethical

Such expressions, however, coming from so strong a necessitarian as Dr.
p. 41.)
Carus, must be taken in a figurative sense.

Problem,

DEVELOPMENTAL ETHICS.

we must

28g

it, or blame nature for
Are we, then, to brand the Russian autocrat as
a perverse fiend, the enemy of his subjects and of mankind ? Leaving aside the fact that his actions are the immutable laws of the
cosmos, we must remember that from his tyranny the freedom of
the Russians will probably be the inevitable consequence, and that,

nature,

being what

it

either ''be pleased" with

is.

without the action of despotism, the reaction of liberty could not
take effect.
And, should it be said that he would be a better man

own

more rights and gave more seand that freedom may exist without previous
oppression, the answer simply is, that this could not be so, for the
all-convincing and unanswerable reason that it is not so
and that,
as said before, we must not confuse in our judgments the logically
if

he, of his

free will, granted

curity to his subjects,

;

possible with the actually possible,

what

exists,

and what does not

the actually possible being

exist being impossible.^

Having presented and discussed what I conceive to be the
most salient inconsistencies of the ethics of development, I shall
now attempt to trace them to their main psychological sources
sources from which, as will be apparent, all ethical systems have
sprung, and from which thej^ draw their very life.
The first source is to be found in the law of conflict between
feeling and judgment.
The nature of this law will be readily seen
by an illustration. A nervous woman may take the five cartridges
out of the five chambers of a pistol, count them and hold them in
her hand; and yet, if the weapon be pointed at her, she will scream
with fright, and not improbably faint away.
Her judgment, it is
evident, tells her, beyond all doubt, that it is impossible that any
harm should come to her from the unloaded weapon; but her
deeply rooted feelings, organised by heredity, or by association, or
both, unavoidably impel her to act in opposition to her correct
judgment. This is a very simple, and, I think, a very plain instance of the law of conflict.
In the higher and more complicated
forms of conduct a similar phenomenon takes place, which, although of a more complex character, is 5'et of the same identical
nature.
Through the combined agencies of heredity and educaIThis view of the possible and impossible was very strongly held by Wyckliffe. According to
'•
that only is possible which is actual, though men may conceive of many things as possible
which in fact are not possible." " Whatever is possible is actual," and therefore God's power
and God's action are identical. This doctrine, as can be easily seen, logically leads, as in fact it
led Wyckliffe, to absolute fatalism and predestination. (See Neander's History of the Church,

him

Vol. v., pp. 166-8, Torrey's translation, Boston, 1871.)
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tion

we

find ourselves possessed of certain feelings (what the orig-

inal source of those feelings

was matters not for our present purwhenever certain circumstances

pose), which, invariably aroused

concur, prompt us to follow, or at least approve, certain lines of
conduct, and to shun, or at least disapprove, certain other lines of

When, however, we endeavor

conduct.

to rationalise our conduct,

reason for our actions, one of two things will happen
either we take our feelings as our starting-point and criterion, in
which case our theory may finally come in conflict with ascertained
to give a

:

truths or other accepted theories, but not,

if

logically developed,

with the given feelings themselves or we may start from other
phenomena, both objective and subjective, and in this case it may
happen that the logical consequences of our theory will come in
;

conflict with the feelings in question,

by establishing facts which,

according to our experience, must give rise to opposite feelings. In
the latter case we find ourselves involved in the perplexities of contradiction

;

for,

conduct, which

owing

to the

as in the

while

we

it

was our purpose

take for granted

is

to give a reason for our

reasonable (not being able,

complexity of the case, to detect our error as easily
of the woman given above), we arrive at the op-

example

posite conduct, or at the opposite feeling, as the only one that is
really reasonable, or rational

;

and as we

still

persist in believing

that our habitual feelings are defensible on rational grounds, simply

because we cannot help feeling and obeying them, we undertake to
frame a theory of reconciliation, which cannot fail to be characterised by its inconsistency.
This, I should venture to say, accounts for the lack of logic
For, so long as the
discoverable in naturalistic systems of ethics.
so-called moral ideals are adhered to, and the feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation are held to be justifiable on scientific
principles, the determinist element of monism, and of naturalism
generally, must be partially surrendered ; the necessary result being
a crippled and vulnerable system, easily accessible through the
breaches made by the admissions of its own advocates. There is
only one logic consistent with determinism the inflexible and implacable logic of Spinoza ;^ and the only conclusion that that logic
warrants is, that there are no such things as right and wrong ; or,
if the word right be permissible, that everything is right.
The antagonism between this conclusion and our inherited feelings ac-

—

1 1

am

however, ignorant of the fact that in Spinoza himself we may often detect serious
the law of
I think, to the general source of error in these matters
But, as a rule, he accepts the consequences of his thoroughgoing necessitarianism.
not,

inconsistencies, traceable,
conflict.

—
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counts, as I have said, for the conciliatory theory of ethics

I have
been analysing in the course of this essay. The antagonism is so
great, and even so shocking, that we recoil in horror when confronted by the bare corollaries of our fundamental propositions ; we
naturally and unconsciously distort the rules of logic, and finally
convince ourselves that there is no such antagonism, but that, on
the contrary, the postulates of determinism are the most solid foundation on which the current, subjective morality can rest.
Qf our
feelings, VNrhich are only one part of our general interests, it may be

what Bentham says

said

of personal interest in general

not "attack men's integrity in front, but undermine

it,"

they do
by strongly
:

directing attention to whatever conforms to them, and diverting it
from whatever conflicts with them. They form an unconscious bias
(unconscious, as it is not apprehended as such) which it is difficult
to eradicate.^

The second source of error is of kindred nature with the first,
and consists in the habit (due, no doubt, to the limitations of the

human understanding)
their

of conceiving

phenomena

as related to their

whereby we disconnect these causes from
necessary accompaniments and antecedents, and regard them,

iimnediate causes only

;

measure, as independent facts and first causes, instead
secondary and component causes, in themselves dependent upon
other causes and determinant circumstances.
This mode of conception is indeed valid, under certain limitations, and even unavoidable for practical purposes, provided we do not fall into the
error of extending it beyond its proper boundaries.
Thus Spinoza
says that we may with propriety speak of some things as depending
upon man's pleasure, although man's will is not free; because, in
in a certain

of

first place, man is a part of nature, and whatever he does is
done by nature through him and, in the second place, because
"we must define and explain things by their immediate causes. "^
In the impossibility of embracing in consciousness, by an intellectual act, the infinite series of causes and effects constituting cosmical existence, we are compelled to abstract the subjects of our
inquiry from the total integral of which they are but differential

the

;

Bentham, Deontology, Vol, IL, Chap, iii., p. 139 (Bowring's edit., 1S34). It is a well-known
Mr. Lecky remarks, we always gravitate towards that intellectual system which is
more in accordance with our emotional nature. " Every moral disposition brings with it an intellectual bias which exercises a great and often a controlling influence upon the most earnest
inquirer." {European Morals, Vol. II., Chap, iv., p. 192, Appleton, 18S9). I may, perhaps, be
allowed to refer to an essay in The Philosophical Revieiv (V., 4, July, 1896), where I have discussed
this subject at somewhat greater length.
1

fact that, as

2

Spinoza, Traite theologico-politique, Chap,

71-72).

vi, {in

QLuvres, translated by Saisset,

t.

II.,

pp.
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terms

;

and by thus breaking the continuity

of nature, or rather,

by

thus studying nature in a discontinuous manner (what we inevitably have to do), we are liable to commit the error, unfortunately
so

common,

of objectifying

our subjective states, and believing that

discontinuity exists not in our conceptions only, but in nature as

Moreover, where the connexion between one

well.

of the

second-

ary or immediate causes with which we have to deal and the rest
of natural phenomena is not easily or accurately discoverable, the

tendency

to

make

of the

disconnexion an objective reality grows in

proportion, and this again engenders the belief (we might say the
feeling) that those

may

immediate causes are independent causes, which

either agree or disagree with the rest of reality

we designate

For obvious reasons, this erroneous habit
is particularly exhibited in our judgments relating to human conduct, whose springs are to us generally unknown (an ignorance
lying, as shov/ed by Spinoza, at the root of the illusory belief in the
freedom and autonomy of the will) and, although we may correct
our judgments and plainly recognise our error, the error, having
been organised as a habit, continues, as in the case of the moral
feelings, to be our unconscious guide, and to vitiate our arguments it makes us forget, in our usual ratiocinations, that we have
changed our premises, our fundamental principles, and leads us
into the belief that the old conclusions and ideas are still legitby the name of nature.

;

;

It is, indeed, a curious fact to notice that, as a general
does not occur to our philosophers that, the whole foundation of philosophy having been relaid, all human conceptions must
be radically changed they prefer to accept the current conceptions, accusing our predecessors of having been poor logicians, who

imate.

rule,

it

:

had the most wonderful
wrong premises.

of

gift

deriving right conclusions from

A very striking illustration of the habit referred to in the preI
ceding paragraph is presented by the writings of Dr. Carus.
have already called attention (indeed, attention has been called to
this for several hundred years) to the inconsistency and incongruity
we

phenomena, and affirming, at the
may, oppose or follow, disagree with or
conform to, natural phenomena. Expressions of this kind may, no
doubt, be used metaphorically but Dr. Carus seems to take them
in a literal sense, and make of such propositions the very foundations of his ethics.
One of the most important definitions with
which he sets forth one which he constantly reasserts, in one form
or another, is, as 1 have had occasion to notice, that ''individuals
in

saying that

same time, that we

are natural

can, or

;

;
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are moral in so far as they conform with the cosmos, in so far as

they become one with the All," and immoral in so far ''as their conduct does not agree" with the laws of the universe.^ And, in order
to

exculpate his ''God"

(i.

e.,

the

"cosmos

")

from the everlasting

accusation of being responsible for the evil existing in the world,
Dr. Carus (although he might have given an irrefutable answer by

saying that an unconscious cosmos can be neither responsible nor
irresponsible) says

:

"The

constitution of the universe

is

such that

we reap as we have sown. When we say 'we' it is understood
that it means not our present individualised existence only, but our
entire

Karma,

of our being.
of the evil

.

and future. It includes all the causes
becomes apparent that not God is guilty

past, present,

Thus

.

.

it

conditions of our state of being, but

we

ourselves."^

on the contradictory nature of such statements, when compared with the first principles of the monistic philosophy ; on the presentation of man as different from nature, or,
in the words of Spinoza, as an empire within another empire. The
while the cause
contradiction itself is, I think, sufficiently obvious
I canof it, its psychological source, I hope to have made clear.
not, however, abstain from referring to the candid answer given to
the embarrassing question of the origin of evil by one of the greatSpinoza him.self.
est expounders of monism
Good and evil, perfection and imperfection, he says, are not
they are
external conditions inhering in the objects of nature
modes of thought, abstractions used for the purpose of comparison.
Of a work of human art we say it is more or less perfect according
I

need not

insist

;

—

:

which it was deThrough our repeated experiences we arrive at the
conception of certain conditions that must be fulfilled in order to
accomplish a proposed end in the best possible manner and this
as

it is

more

or less adapted to the purposes for

signed by man.

;

an ideal
which the object to be attained must conform, and a deviation
from which we consider an imperfection. This, hov/ever, always
presupposes an end in view, a purpose; but of an object which is
made for no end or purpose we cannot say that it is either perfect
or imperfect, there being no term of comparison. Once, therefore,
we have discarded the idea that there is an intelligent design in
universal phenomena, the problem of whether things be perfect or
imperfect, in their relations to the whole cosmos, becomes entirely
unm.eaning and our endeavors to give it a meaning are based
end, as represented in consciousness before

it is

to

;

1
2

Fundamental Problems, pp.
The Monist, Vol.

IV.,

3,

20S, 315, 321.

p. 413

:

" Ethics

The

italics are

mine.

and Cosmic Order."

realised, is
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''rather on a prejudice than on a true knowledge of nature"; on
the prejudice, namely, that nature aims at the attainment of special
ends.^ As to the origin of good and evil, they have, no doubt, as

they
their source, their cause, in the very essence of God
however, subjective states existing only in our minds, but
which, considered in relation to God, have no significance, in the
Right and wrong are equally indifsense of antagonistic realities.
ferent to God, since they represent emotional conditions of joy and
grief, of which God is not capable ; and it is only in a figurative
sense that we can say we disagree with God or sin against God.^
Among the causes to which the inconsistency of developmental
ethics is traceable might also be mentioned the belief in the freedom of the will, which, although rejected in principle, has left profound marks even in the minds of the most thorough-going deterThis important subject, however, would compel me to
minists.
extend this article beyond the space at my command. The reader,
all else,

;

are,

I

think, will

paragraphs
1

have no difficulty in applying the principles of the last
unconscious survival of the free-will philosophy.

to the

Spinoza, Ethics, Pt. IV., Introduction; also, Lettre a Blyenbergh (in Qiuvres,

402-404).

'^Lettre

ct

Blyenbergh

(in

CEuvres,

t.

III.,

pp. 395-397).

t.

III.,

pp

